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GERHARD THÜR (GRAZ) 
RESPONSE TO LENE RUBINSTEIN 
Methodologically the "dangerous liaisions" - as Lene Rubinstein originally entitled 
her paper - are very successful and fruitful ones . Like her excellent book about 
courtroom supporters , her paper, too , has combined the statistical methods of simple 
counting introduced long aga by her teacher Mogens Hansen, with deep insights into 
the legal problems and strategies of litigation in Athenian courts . Missing , in my 
opinion , are three legal aspects: first the historical development of the witness as a 
legal institution in Athens, second a brief look at other Greek cities (both, 
admittedly, out of the scope of the paper), and third a closer distinction of the 
witnesses' duties in the preliminary procedure on one side and in the main trial on 
the other . 
I remember long discussions I had with Mogens Hansen many years ago about 
the question whether there were oath-helpers (Eideshelfer) in Athenian procedure. At . 
that time I thought the Athenian witness was, genetically, very close to 
'Eideshelfer'. Hansen denied this. Rubinstein, in her paper, gave an answer in the 
sense of her teacher and I am convinced by her arguments . Very cautiously she left 
aside homicide cases (n . 7) . With good reason she concentrated on Athens in the time 
of the orators and gave precise answers to precisely formulated questions, avoiding 
speculation - as many scholars would call it - about the development of the Greek 
law of evidence from archaic to classical times. In my short response I cannot supply 
that either. 
Following S .c. Humphreys, the paper starts by grouping Athenian witnesses 
into concentric circles . Humphreys regarded the witness very generally as a supporter 
of one or the other litigant. Stephen Todd was the first to differentiate along 
procedurallines , according to public and private actions . Rubinstein goes into much 
more detail. She refines Humphreys ' concentric circles, replacing them by ten groups 
of witnesses. She also supplements Todd's rough differentiation by regarding the 
type of testimony within cach type of action. 
I think one can follow her first conclusion , that - as far as witnesses are 
concemed - friends , relatives, and private connections were not automatically 
perceived as the most obvious supporters of Athenian litigants. Ta be sure, we must 
not fall into the other extreme: of course the Athenians showa strang tendency to 
produce such persans as witnesses in court, especially in private cases. 
The second conclusion also will stand: to carry weight with the judges, litigants 
did not present the widest possible range of personal supporters as witnesses, but · 
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those who were held to have the best knowledge of the facts to be testified to. Here I 
raise my first point of criticism . As correct1y stated in the paper, witnesses gave no 
information but just confrrmed the wording of testimony formulated by one of the 
litigants. Accordingly, no next of kin gave " information that might not be 
universally available," nor were ex officio witnesses "to reveal what they knew ." No 
witness gave more information than the litigant already had and supplied the court 
with . However, it was of greatest advantage for a litigant to produce as a witness that 
person who was most competent to know the fact to be testified to. The strategy was 
not to give the COUlt the best and widest possible information, but to present the 
most competent person on one's side. By the example of Aischines' use of the 
general Phokion and the taxiarchos Termenides as witnesses for his bravery at sea, 
the paper shows how an orator was able to combine competent witnesses with 
citizens of the highest reputation, and also structured his speech to fit these a/echnoi 
pis/eis . 
With the above mentioned more or less terminological correction, I agree with 
both main conclusions of the paper. So far, only social, historical, and philological 
aspects are touched. Wh ether in classical Athens a witness was a personal supporter 
or an outsider is not a legal question. However, to reach her conclusions Rubinstein 
deals with legal problems as weIl. In my opinion these most interesting parts of her 
paper are worth presenting as main conclusions also . 
The most important legal points are, first, the purpose of dike pseudoltUlrtyrion 
and second, the constraint upon a witness unwilling to testify in court and the 
possible ways of avoiding this constraint. It is common opinion now that the dike 
pseudomartyrion gave the losers of an action the possibility to claim damages from 
witnesses who could be held responsible for their loss. Bonner'sl opinion that the 
condemned witness had to pay the sum to the state is not correct. But what about the 
cases where a winner sues a witness, as in Lysias 10 .22,25, 30, Isocrates 18.54 arx:I 
Isaeus 3.4? Here the concem is not personal compensation but satisfaction for lost 
reputation, personal revenge, or building a case for further litigation . According to 
Lys . 10.22, Dionysios had testified that Theomnestos threw away his shield -
testimony normally subject to a dike kakegorias . Here, the dike pseudomartyrion was 
only a matter of honor.2 
It is generally known that many potential witnesses were afraid to take the risk 
of a dike pseudoltUlrtyrion. The paper deals with this issue in detail. The easiest way 
for the witness to avoid testifying is to swear an oath, the exomosia, normally 
formulated as "not to know ." This formula is exactly the opposite of the usual 
formulaic beginning of a testimony "to know something" (Eiöevo:t), and, in my 
opinion, through this oath the witness does not deny knowledge, but the facts he is 
1 RJ. Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts (1905) 92; followed by E. Berneker, 
RE XXIII/2 (1959) 1364-1375, s.v . IjIEUÖOIlUP'tUPlwv Öl1CT]. 
2 See G. Thür, Der Streit über den Status des Werkstättenleiters Milyas, Demosthelles 
ed . U. Schindel (1987) 412 , 429 . 
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asked to confirm by the litigant.3 In German terminology these witnesses are called 
"Zufallszeugen" (witnesses by chance) as opposed to "Geschäftszeugen" (witnesses 
called to assist a legal act) . The latter - referred to in Hypereides 4.12 - testify with 
the formula "to have been present at" (7tUpuYEvecrSat). Dem. 46 .6 exactly relates 
to these two types of witnesses: oi. Öe YE v6!iot ou 'tuu'tu Aeyoucrtv, aAA' Ci &. v 
Eiöfl 'tte; Kat oIe; &.v 7tapayevll'tat 7tpa't'to!ieVOte;, 'tau'ta !iap'tUPEtV KEAEuOUcrlV 
("The laws do not say this, but ordain that a man may testify to what he knows or to 
the matter at the doing of which he was present") . So, I think the COirect formula of 
an exomosia of a 7tapaYEvecrSat-testimony must have been "!iT, 7tapaYEvecrSat". 
Once he swore an exomosia - as we will see, during the preliminary procedures , 
the anakrisis or the public diaita - the witness was free from any responsibility . 
Committing perjury had no legal but, according the general remarks of David Cohen 
in this volume,4 severe social sanctions. 
A witness sumrnoned by a litigant and who had not sworn the exomosia was 
obliged to testify in court. This involved two steps of constraint: first to bring a 
witness before the magistrate or the public diatetes, and second to bring him into · 
court. In private actions there were two indirect measures of constraint, a dike 
lipomartyriou and a dike blabes (Dem. 49 .19-20) .5 
In Athenian sources on this subject we have only a few allusions in the 
speeches; from outside Athens statutes are preserved. In the treaty between 
Stymphalos in Arcadia and Demetrias-Sikyon from 302-300 B .e., Iines 10-13 
provide that a sumrnoned witness had to pay the whole sum of the lawsuit to the 
injured party if he did not appear in court, unless he had sworn the apomosia -
corresponding to the Athenian exomosia - be fore the magistrate: O!iocreX!iEVOe; E7tt 
'tal anal 'tal 'tue; ÖtKae; ypa<poucrue; 'tov v6!it!iov ÖPKOV !iT, tcr!iEV 'tuv 
!iap'tuptav ("having sworn before the magistrate who has registered the action the 
legitimate oath not to know the testimony").6 Doubtful is an oath provision in the 
Thasian law on the wine trade (c . 480 B .e.) line 8/9: 7tIEpt 'tö OtVO vlli:8ille; ... öpm; 
("oath not to know about the wine"); the law forbids swearing this oath .7 
3 See G. Thür, Beweisführung vor den Schwurgerichtshäfen Athens (1977) 131 , 317 . 
4 See his section 111 about the religious background of Athenian society . 
S Briefly mentioned in Rubinstein n. 20. Dike lipomartyriou (Dem . 49 .19) seems to be 
against a witness who failed to appear before the diaitetes (but see below, n. 10). A 
blabe (Dem. 49.20; cf. also 29.15) can occur only after the party who had summoned 
the witness has lost his case in the dikasterion, see A.R.W. Harrison , The Law of 
Athens 11 (1971) 143f. 
6 See G. Thür and H. Taeuber, Prozeßrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis : 
Arkadien (1994) 239f. 
7 H.w.Pleket, Epigraphical(1964) no . I. D.C. Gofas, BCH95 , 1971, 245-57 has 
good arguments for a purgatory oath to be sworn by the defendant. Nevertheless , 
prohibiting an oath "not to know" seems to be more appropriate to witnesses whose 
special duty is to keep knowledge of something (probably referred to in the previous 
lines now broken away) . I thank Prof. Velissaropoulos for the reference. 
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The paper points to Dem. 45.60 as an example that in Athens exomosia was 
also sworn before the court. The story starts at section 57: Apollodoros reproaches 
Stephanos with having stolen a document during the last session of the public diaita 
against Phormio, when he , Apollodoros, was ab se nt to execute an exomosia (as 
usual in the pretrial stage) . In the dike pseudomartyrion against Stephanos , 
Apollodoros summoned so me fnends of Phormio to testify to the theft committed 
by Stephanos. As expected, these people did not testify against Stephanos, but swore 
the exomosia . As I will show in more detail elsewhere,' most probably they also 
had sworn it in the pretrial stage , and in this short passage Apollodoros was only 
creating artificial suspense . From the same speech (45.48) we learn that 
admjnistering an exomosia took a considerable amount oftime . Moreover, Ath. Pol. 
(55.5; cf. 7.1) mentions that, as a particularly celebrated oath, the exomosia was 
sworn on the stone be fore the Stoa of the archon basileus.9 Thus , an altar in the 
court room (Rubinstein, n . 15) is of no help . From a rhetoncal aspect, it is 
completely out of the question that because of this totally insignificant charge that 
Stephanos stole the document, Apollodoros would have depmted together with the 
witnesses to the stone by the Stoa of the basileus, and left the jurors behind with 
nothing to do . Even an oath ceremony before the court, assuming it would have been 
allowed, would have caused a longer interruption and thereby destroyed the logical 
progress ofthe rhetorically well constructed story (45.57-62) . My conclusion is that 
witnesses having sworn the exomosia must appear at the court in the same way as 
those willing to confirm the martyria. Presumably, Apollodoros wanted to show the 
judges personally what kind of "friends and associates" (45.60) Phormion had. The 
whole scene is one of sophisticated manoeuvres by Apollodoros; his uncertainty 
(45 .58) is fabricated. Especially here a clear distinction between preliminary stage 
and main trial is necessary. 
At the end I want to stress the most important legal result of the paper: the 
indirect constraint on a witness by a compensation claim did not work in public 
actions, and therefore the institution of kleteusis was most probably introduced only 
for those cases .1O This is a small but important new insight in the otherwise weil 
known Athenian law of procedure. 
8 The role of the witness in Athenian law, The Cambridge Companion 10 Ancient Creek 
Law eds. D . Cohen and M . Gagarin (in press), where also Isai . 9 .18- 19 and Lyk. 1.20 
(both mentioned in the paper, n . 15) will be discussed . 
9 See PJ. Rhodes, A Commentary on the ArislOtelian Athenaion Politeia (1981; 
' 1993) 136, 620. 
10 The on1y private case, Dem . 32 .30, remains obscure; " to serve a surnmons on 
someone who is abroad" (Rubinstein , n. 22) one can hard1y say about Pro tos as a 
"witness" (30 .29) . In Dem . 18 .150 KATl'tE1)ElY is the activity of KA.ll"CliPE~, the 
witnesses (cf. Cl eiöw~) of a summons, cf. Harrison , I.c. 85. HJ . Wolff, Die attische 
Paragraphe (1966) 47 (with further references, n. 61) seems to be correct that in this 
private case (Dem . 32.30) K}"ll"CEUElV is a step necessary to dike lipomartyriou . 
